Based on an analysis of 150 documents collected between 2012 and 2015 from bookstores, websites and YouTube channels operated by Salafi mosques and organisations in Britain and Germany, this article discusses the different strategies adopted in European Salafi discourse in an effort to disassociate salafiyya from al-Qaeda, ISIS and other Jihadi-Salafi movements. The article suggests that the target audience of these rebuttals are Western governments and publics, who suspect salafiyya to be a breeding-ground for terror, as well as mosque attendees, who are exposed to jihadi-salafi denunciations of Salafi anti-politics and anti-violence agendas. It introduces the diverse set of arguments invoked by Salafis to defend their opposition to violent attacks on Western soil, including the religious duties to abide by contracts, respect Islamic rules of warfare and the regulations on initiating jihad, avoid harming the interests of Muslims and of Islam in Europe, and oppose modern-day Khawarij of whom the Prophet Muḥammad warned.
Introduction
The term 'the Muslim minority in Europe', so commonplace today in popular and academic discourses, is reductionist and misleading. It postulates that for a majority of individuals of Muslim faith on the continent, the religious aspect of identity overrides all other aspects, including national, ethnic and socio-economic. This is not the case. It also postulates that the Muslims of Europe agree on a substantial enough body of religious doctrine and practice to render their analyses as a singular, coherent group instructive. This, too, is not the case. Rather than one 'Muslim minority', Europe is home to a variety of attitudes regarding the role of Islam in public and personal life, and to a variety of Muslim associations that fiercely debate core Islamic concepts and have demonstrated a greater tendency to split than to unite. True, with some exceptions, a majority of Muslims in Europe share the foundations of faith that all Muslims share. Also, a majority among Muslims in Europe shares a political interest in seeing their freedom of religion broadened, and their right not to be discriminated against protected. But in all other senses, there exists a plurality of minority Muslim groups.
One such group is the Salafis. Representing a tiny minority among Muslim populations in Europe, 1 and an approach to Islamic law and theology that most European Mus-1 In June 2015, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) put the number of Salafis in Germany at around 7,500, i.e., around 0.2 percent of the total Muslim population. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), accessed 5 February 2016: <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-islamismusund-islamistischer-terrorismus/was-ist-islamismus/salafistische-bestrebungen>. -Abū Ḫadīǧa ʿAbd al-Wahīd, one of three imams of the Salafi Mosque of Birmingham, the heartland of English salafiyya, estimated in an interview with the author (10 October 2015) that 4,000 of the city's 200,000 Muslims are Salafis. In other Salafi concentrations in England their share of the population is even smaller.
Salafiyya: An Introduction
According to a tradition narrated by ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar, the Prophet said: 'The best people are those living in my generation, and then those who will follow them, and then those who will follow the latter. Then there will come some people who will bear witness before taking oaths, and take oaths before bearing witness.' The tradition implies that the closer Muslims were to the days of the Prophet, the better their conduct was. It is the basis for a foundational point of consensus among Sunni jurists that the first three generations of Islam, known collectively as the pious ancestors (salaf), provide the example that Muslims should follow and, thus, are the ultimate reference for believers. Because of this consensus, different and contesting Islamic groups have sought to have their doctrines associated with the banner salafiyya. The great success of Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi religious establishment and its disciples abroad in doing so in recent decades owes much to the vast financial resources at the disposal of the world's leading oil producer. Contemporary Salafi works argue that their definition as 'Wahhabi', suggesting that they follow in the footsteps of an eighteenth-century scholar rather than those of the salaf, is an intentional insult on the part of those wishing to degrade them.
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Contemporary salafiyya considers itself heir to the legacies of Aḥmad b. Research and Fatwas (al-Laǧna al-Dāʾima li'l-Buḥūṯ al-ʿIlmiyya waʼl-Iftāʾ) . Most, but not all, prominent contemporary Salafis are Saudi-born.
Salafis consider themselves to be committed only to the teachings of the Quran and the Prophetic traditions and, thus, the emissaries of the beliefs and practices of the salaf. Central to their teachings are tawḥīd (the oneness of Allah) as the guiding principle of Islam, and the rejection of širk (associating partners with Allah) 3 and of bidʿa (unlawful innovation). While these are core beliefs for all Muslims, Salafis apply them in a way that delegitimises opposing theological and religio-juristic views, as well as emphasises the importance of individual piety and the undesirability of political involvement. 4 Ṣāliḥ al-Fawzān, a member of the Saudi Council of Senior Scholars and of the Permanent Committee, answered his rhetorical question about why Salafis ʻalways talk about tawḥīdʼ instead of discussing the plights of contemporary Muslims by insisting that in order to solve the problems Muslims face, it is essential ʻto seek out the reasons that have led to the punishments afflicting the Muslimsʼ. These reasons are the absence of tawḥīd from the lives of most Muslims, manifested in behaviours such as praying to religious figures as intercessors with Allah, and clinging to graves and tombs, as well as not praying, emphasise that engagements with non-Muslims should be based on the principle of alwalāʾ wa'l-barāʾ (loyalty and disavowal); the latter implies avoiding the imitation of nonMuslims, as well as refraining from extending friendship or loyalty to them. 5 However, Salafis, including Ibn Bāz, have strictly prohibited violent attacks against non-Muslims and required that they be treated gently.
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The Salafi juristic approach is literalist, heavily drawing on the authority of the Prophetic traditions and restricting (while not rejecting altogether) the accommodation of religious laws to changing circumstances. Socially, Salafis preach for rigid gender segregation, require women to veil their faces for fear of fitna (temptation), strictly limit the roles of women in public spheres, and explicitly describe women as less intelligent than men.
7 They also discourage leisure activities and prohibit playing and listening to music.
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Salafis maintain an elitist mentality. Drawing on a Prophetic tradition according to which the nation will divide into 73 sects, of which only one will escape hellfire, they believe themselves to be the 'saved sect'. Both pose a direct threat to the survival of the House of Saʿūd. Thus, to effectively discredit their theological credibility is a primary political concern of the regime.
Since the 1970s, Salafis have produced a rich and distinct corpus of theoretical deliberations and fatwas on Muslim minorities. One foundation of their approach is that settlement in Western lands is undesirable, and can only be legitimised under specific circumstances and conditions. A primary justification is engagement in proselytising. Another foundation is that Muslim minorities are not entitled to any special concessions because of the unique hardships they encounter. This position is derived from the foundational Salafi view that Allah's laws are universal and should be interpreted and applied literally. Salafis hold that the duty to disavow applies also to majority non-Muslim societies, and thus encourage social isolation. These views differ from other conceptualisations on Muslims in the West, including those of the wasaṭī ('harmonising middle ground school') pragmatically-inclined Dublin-based European Council for Fatwa and Research, headed by the Qatarbased Egyptian jurist Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī.
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Since the 1990s, a Salafi presence has developed in European countries. Salafi organisations accept Salafi Saudi-based jurists and panels as a reference (marǧiʿiyya). They are led by imams who studied in Saudi Arabian universities or were inspired by graduates of these universities and endorse them. They publish and sell books, pamphlets, and sermons of Salafi scholars. With their thickly-bearded, traditionally-attired men and heavily veiled women, Salafi communities are easily recognisable, epitomising for some Europeans the 'non-integrated Muslim'.
There exist no pan-continental or even national-level Salafi panels or organisations that unite them. Rather, there are independently established mosques, associations, Islamic centres and publishers that function on a local level, often rivalling one another. Wiktorowicz's anatomy of the Salafi movement pointed to a split between the apolitical trend of 'purists' (who support the official line of the Saudi religious establishment, which opposes the involvement of religious scholars in politics-for obvious political motivations) and the 'politicos' who engage with politics as a means to generate socio-religious transformation.
12 As demonstrated by Hamid, 13 the conflict between the two trends contributed to divisions in English salafiyya in the 1990s, and, as observed by Wiedl, it also resonated in Germany.
14 The absence of unity among European Salafis is not, however, always the 10 Hegghammer, who characterised Jihadi-Salafis as an extremist blending of the Wahhabi religious tradition and the Quṭbist Islamist trend and pointed to its internationalist orientation, traced the earliest origins of the term to an interview given in 1994 to the London-based jihadi magazine al-Anṣār by Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī, al-Qaeda's current leader and a former member of the Egyptian Quṭbist Islamic Jihad. Academic literature has extensively debated the extent to which the association of salafiyya with violent radicalisation, particularly among a minority of Muslim youths, is justified. A study published in 2007 by the New York Police Department (NYPD) analysed the backgrounds of terrorists involved in ten terror attacks in North America, Europe and Australia, and exposed a correlation between a period of engagement with Salafi literature and a later retreat from the radical environment and embrace of Jihadi arguments.
16 A study in Germany suggested that while there are some 2,600 mosques in the country, 36.7 percent of the 110 German Muslim jihadists whose biographies were studied and whose attendance of a specific mosque could be verified had been attendees of six Salafi mosques.
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Rakic and Jurisic argued that through Saudi financing, Salafism incites fanaticism, intolerance and jihad, and urged European governments to address the challenge with greater firmness. 18 Wiktorowicz argued that violent tendencies inherent to the ideology of Salafis render their communities a breeding ground for terrorists, but nevertheless cautioned against neglecting to differentiate between non-violent salafiyya and jihadi-salafiyya.
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Similarly, specifically addressing the German context, Logvinov noted the hate-speech of Salafis as a danger, but cautioned against not differentiating between Salafi variants.
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Abdel-Latif further challenged the correlation between salafiyya and violence. She argued that while jihadi-salafiyya receives disproportionate attention, the majority of Salafis (which she defined in very broad terms) are not radical. She advised Western governments to engage in dialogue with the Salafi mainstream, as do governments in the Arab world.
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In a similar vein, Lambert noted that many Salafis are at the forefront of the fight against terror and argued that their labelling as jihadi by security organisations is counterproductive.
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15 See for example in Ar-RAYYIS 2010. His words of preaching lamented that ʻmany of the Salafi centers in Europe-after being places of knowledge, learning and study-change into places of differing, problems and argumentation among the Salafi themselvesʼ. 
British and German Salafi anti-Jihadist Discourses
In interviews by the author with Salafi leaders in Germany and England, they stressed their commitment to swaying youth away from the path of violence, and the positive impact their activities have. At al-Muḥsinīn Mosque, Bonn, I was told that whenever a young attendee is getting the wrong ideas from the internet, he or she is taken to the 
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These views are systematically developed in Salafi texts. A survey of bookstores attached to Salafi mosques in Britain and Germany, as well as of internet websites and YouTube channels associated with Salafi organisations in both countries, revealed rich and anxious discourses aimed at affirming the distinction between Salafis and Jihadi-Salafis and convincing individual Muslims that joining the ranks of violent groups constitutes deviation from Islam. While both discourses are unequivocal in their utter opposition to violent attacks, the anti-Jihadi-Salafi discourse in Britain is far more prolific and organised than the German one, and presents a more diverse and religio-juristically developed body of arguments. It involves a plethora of books, articles, leaflets and audio and visual posts that are dedicated exclusively to this issue, whereas in Germany it is based largely on occasional sermons recorded and posted on YouTube.
The reason for this discrepancy is not that German Salafis are less motivated to condemn violence against Western targets. On the contrary, because salafiyya is defined by Germany's Federal Ministry of the Interior and the agency for the protection of the constitution (Verfassungsschutz) as a movement that challenges German democracy, and mosques labelled as Salafi are subsequently placed under surveillance, German Salafis are motivated to unequivocally condemn violence, and at times do so outlandishly. (One example is two posters hung on the windows of the Salafi al-Raḥmān mosque in Leipzig for all passers-by to see: 'Wir sind gegen Terror, Gewalt; Wir sind für Frieden, Dialog, Integration' -ʻWe are against terror, violence; we support peace, dialogue, integrationʼ).
25
Two other explanations come to mind. First, whereas the English roots of salafiyya are traced to the early 1990s, 26 those of German salafiyya are traced to the early 2000s. There is an element of apologetics, directed towards non-Muslim majorities-especially their governments and law enforcement authorities-in both British and German Salafi preaching against violent activities. Salafi texts seek to separate their approach in the public mind from jihadi-salafiyya and, moreover, to establish their doctrine as the most effective means of combating radical tendencies, and, thus, an esteemed ally in the battle against radicalism. One example is a Salafi treatise that argued that to associate Salafi theologians with al-Qaeda is similar to arguing that Fidel Castro is an ardent supporter of democracy. Salafiyya and terror, it stated, are like oil and water.
28 Another treatise bemoaned the large amounts of money that are wasted by Britain on organisations and think tanks that promise to lead counter-radicalisation efforts but cannot deliver because of their paltry status among Muslim communities. It suggested that the only way to effectively appeal to the minds of those who support jihadi operations is to provide them with evidence based on the Quran and the Prophetic traditions and counter their claim for being the authentic representation of Islam with a more convincing one.
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Still, the primary target audience of Salafi anti-violence campaigns in Britain and Germany is Muslims living in the West, first and foremost the young and easily impressed, who are also the ones most likely to be exposed to Salafi sources. In making the case against al-Qaeda, ISIS and other Jihadi-Salafi organisations, Salafi preachers introduced an array of arguments that describes acts such as the 7/7 attacks on the London underground and Charlie Hebdo attacks as a breach of different Islamic norms, as acts that damaged the welfare of Muslims at large and the prospects of spreading Islam in the West, and a continuation of a historical legacy of deviation against which the Prophet Muḥammad warned. The unifying theme is authenticity: Salafis-adhering to a doctrine whose raison d'être and central source of appeal is its claim to adhere loyally to the teachings of the Prophet and his Companions-struggle to demonstrate that their rejection of violence is the correct interpretation of Islam, whereas violent attacks by Muslim residents of Western countries represent a deviation that must be rejected not for fear of Western security apparatuses, but for fear of Allah. The following are the main arguments presented in this discourse.
Abiding by contracts
This argument emphasises the duty of Muslims living in the West to abide by the Islamic norm of respecting contracts. Visas given by Western countries, and citizenship in Western countries, are regarded as a breached contract if one actively joins the ranks of an enemy while still under the contract. The implication is that regardless of how one feels about the West, and regardless of whether one believes that violent attacks are beneficial to Muslim causes, there are certain obligations all Muslims must abide by that render attacks, such as the 9/11, 7/7, Charlie Hebdo or Paris Attacks, prohibited acts. Thus, Muslims who refrain from joining the ranks of al-Qaeda, ISIS or independent groups exercise self-control and true devotion, not allowing emotions, even when running high, to overcome their duties to Allah.
The contractual argument is also invoked by rivals of salafiyya. For example, Aḥmad Ǧāballāh, a member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, argued that even in cases when a non-Muslim country acts unjustly against others, including Muslims, Muslims in that country cannot betray their government because Islam prohibits the breaching of contracts.
30 However, whereas in the wasaṭī case this argument is invoked as part of a broader legitimisation of extending loyalty and friendship to non-Muslims (and as such, a refutation of the Salafi concept of 'loyalty and disavowal'), Salafis invoke it narrowly as a means of making the point that while 'disavowing' is part of the faith, it should by no means involve using violence.
One example is 'Words to the Muslim youth of Britain' by al-ʿUṯaymīn, published at least twice in the newsletter of a Bradford-based Salafi organisation as part of its anti-jihadi campaigns. Relying on a tradition according to which the Prophet said that whoever kills someone who is under an agreement will not smell the fragrance of paradise, al-ʿUṯaymīn stated that Muslims should respect the majority non-Muslim societies in which they reside, because
The land in which you are living is such that there is an agreement between you and them. If this were not the case, they would have killed you or expelled you. So preserve this agreement, and do not prove treacherous to it, since treachery is a sign of the hypocrites, and it is not from the believers.
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The Salafi author ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Mahdī presented the contractual argument as a response to what he defined as the ʻemotional argumentsʼ invoked by Muslims in the West who commit violent acts. Emotional arguments include that the kuffār (infidels) have betrayed Muslims and, therefore, it is allowed to betray them; that British and American soldiers kill Muslims in Iraq and in Afghanistan, so it is allowed to kill them in their countries; and that the kuffār have acted treacherously towards the Muslims in Palestine and Somalia through their support of Israeli and Ethiopian aggressions respectively, so their blood is lawful to Muslims. According to Mahdī, none of the abovementioned grievances justify acts of violence. Unlike the emotional, misguided Muslim, the informed Muslim will recognise that respecting a covenant, i.e., visa or citizenship, to which he is a party, is a farḍ ʿayn-an Similarly, a leaflet published by the Birmingham-based Salafi Bookstore on the ways to combat ISIS and al-Qaeda noted that Muslims may participate in jihad only if war is declared by leaders and governments and not by ʻindividual citizens, or insurgents and pulpits, or through social media!ʼ Hinting at the discrepancy between al-Qaeda's and ISIS's global ambitions and their limited military capabilities, the leaflet further established that a legitimate Muslim army that engages in jihad must have the necessary strength to fight or repel attacks and, if not, it is permitted to retreat or initiate peace treaties.
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Just warfare
Salafi anti-jihadi preaching states that Muslims must, at all times, respect the Islamic regulations on the conduct of warfare. This argument, too, suggests that regardless of their motivations and effects, the operational methods applied by al-Qaeda, ISIS and individuals who identify with them, whether in the Middle East or on European soil, are illegitimate because they breach clear instructions given by the Prophet that are valid at all times and in all circumstances.
For example, Ḥasan Dabbāġ, the imam of the Leipzig al-Raḥmān mosque, explained in a sermon posted on YouTube that Islam is a religion that rejects extremism and terrorism and forbids killing innocent people and ʻcommitting bad actsʼ. He emphasised that he was making this point not because he was concerned about how Germans Berlin-based Moroccan preacher and the subject of much media controversy in Germany over his alleged radicalism, described in great detail, seething with disgust and astonishment, beheadings and mass executions by ISIS, judging them to be repulsive atrocities that counter the spirit of Islam. He defined ISIS as a virus and a poisonous seed. 36 In another sermon he emphasised the importance of treating non-Muslims with respect and the sanctity of all human lives.
37 The above-mentioned leaflet by the Birmingham-based Salafi Bookstore stressed that Muslims who engage in jihad must not harm noncombatants, including ʻwomen, children, monks, emissaries, teachers, nurses, doctors, aid workers and othersʼ, 38 whereas the aforementioned treatise by Mahdī emphasised that ʻIslam unequivocally forbids the targeting of non-combatants during times of war or peace. An act of violence, suicidal or otherwise, against innocent or otherwise peaceful men, women and children is, simply, terrorismʼ. As part of his defence for his opinion, Mahdī cited the instance in which the Prophet once passed an idolatress who had fallen during a battle. He denounced her killing, insisting that the woman was not the one against who war was to be fought.
The maṣlaḥa of Islam and Muslims
Another argument against jihadi-salafī acts is that they lead to the characterisation of Muslim citizens as a potential fifth column and raise alarm about Muslim organisations at large, and thus injure the public interest of Muslim communities and damage the ability to propagate Islam. In this context, violent attacks are presented as a mafsada (an action that is the opposite of maṣlaḥa in that it harms the fulfilment of one of the primary objectives of the sharia).
For example, in a ʻwarning against the extremistsʼ, published by a Bradford-based Salafi organisation in response to the 7/7 attacks, ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-ʿUbaykān (a member of the Council of Senior Scholars and the Permanent Committee), argued that the attacks resulted in ʻmany negativesʼ: they damaged coexistence between the British people and the Muslim minority in Britain, and have placed the latter in ʻa difficult position and, perhaps, caused some aggravation. The least of them being that this has portrayed Muslims as a possible security threat.ʼ Acts such as 7/7, argued al-ʿUbaykān, damage the reputation that the Muslim minority in Britain has gained and the rights it has acquired, and those plotting acts of violence should be exposed and uprooted so as to allow the Muslim population to live in peace and spread true Islam. 41 The verses state: ʻAllah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes-from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly. Allah only forbids you from those who fight you because of religion and expel you from your homes and aid in your expulsion-forbids that you make allies of them. And whoever makes allies of them, then it is those who are the wrongdoers.ʼ The Quran 1997.
who do not fight against them, and cautioned that modern-day ʻextremist-Islamistsʼ marred the beauty of Islam and turned ʻcountless people away from looking into the true message of the Prophet Muḥammadʼ. Based on this evaluation, the leaflet called on Muslims who learn about individuals who incite or plan ʻterrorist acts such as suicide bombings, kidnapping or killingʼ to inform the authorities, regardless of whether said acts are to be perpetrated in Muslim or non-Muslim countries.
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Historical analogy
In 656/35, the third caliph, ʿUṯmān, was assassinated, and the Prophet's cousin, ʿAlī, took his place. The power struggle that ensued between Muʿāwiya, the governor of Syria and a relative of ʿUṯmān, and ʿAlī's supporters, reached a climax in Ṣiffīn in 657/37, when Muʿāwiya's supporters lifted spears with pages of the Quran and called for the dispute to be settled by a group of arbitrators. ʿAlī reluctantly accepted this proposition. Some of his supporters believed that he made a grave mistake, arguing that the Quran commands that they continue fighting. As a result, they split from his camp and came to be known as the Khawarij (ʻthose who leftʼ, or ʻthe renegadesʼ). They developed a political theology according to which only an individual recognised by consensus as the best of Muslims is a legitimate caliph, and continuously rebelled against the House of the Umayyads. Their political legacy challenges a broad agreement that developed in Sunni jurisprudence (and is especially highlighted by Salafis) that places harsh restrictions against launching armed rebellions against Muslim leaders, even sinning and failing ones.
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Salafi British and German preaching against Jihadi-Salafism draws a direct link between the Khawarij, the teachings of Sayyid Quṭb, Egyptian Jihadi groups that applied Quṭb's doctrine, and contemporary groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, which do not recognise any of the existing Muslim regimes as legitimate. The Khawarij, who were ultimately on the losing side of Islamic history, came to be broadly regarded as a deviant group, beyond the pale of legitimacy. The analogy between them and the modern enemies of salafiyya is intended to delegitimise them.
Examples vary, demonstrating the centrality of this analogy in the Salafi anti-jihadi discourse. A Berlin-based Salafi preacher, Aḥmad Abū 'l-Barāʾ, drew a parallel between the Khawarij, whom the Prophet said would kill Muslims but spare the lives of idolworshippers, and ISIS, who, according to al-Barāʾ, do exactly that. He called on Muslims to heed the Prophet's warning against those who seem to follow the Quran and appear devout 42 Combating 21st Century Violent Extremist Terrorism n.d. 43 Perhaps the best known articulation of this position was Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī's (d. 505/1111). He held that without a ruler, order and stability are impossible, and thus a corrupt ruler, who came to power unlawfully, is preferable to anarchy. GIBB 2001: 10-11. Another prominent example is Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), who believed that to rule a people is one of the most important religious duties, without which religion cannot exist. He held that the ruler, responsible for maintaining law and order and enabling the believers to perform their duties towards Allah, was to be entrusted with absolute powers, regardless of his character, the title he assumes, or how he came to power. Four centuries before Thomas Hobbes, he suggested that people's willingness to obey kings, regardless of whether they are religious or not, is a result of their understanding that it is the only way to secure their well-being. IBN TAYMIY-YA n.d. : 161; al-ENAZY 2010: 13-15; RAWĀS 1998, vol. 1: 285-300. but, in fact, are not. 44 In his ʻwarning against the extremistsʼ, al-ʿUbaykān relied on this analogy to argue that those responsible for violent attacks are actually worse than the original Khawarij because they had added to the sin of unjustified excommunication by ʻviolating their covenants and transgressing against the people of the book and other than them, who have agreements with the Muslimsʼ.
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In January 2015, following the attacks on the staff of Charlie Hebdo in Paris, an English Salafi website dedicated to fighting extremism published the reaction of the Medina-based daʿwa activist, ʿUbayd al-Ǧābirī, who described the assassinations as acts of Khawarij, ʻthe scum, the savages and the anarchistsʼ. Echoing the Salafi portrayal of the Muslim Brothers (Iḫwānī) as a group that leads Muslims astray, al-Ǧābirī suggested that the attacks had been orchestrated by Iḫwānī activists who wished to injure the position of Salafis living in the West by provoking the resentment of the majority society. He advised Muslims residing in the West, specifically their imams, to ʻopenly announce [their] disavowal and innocence from this action and other actions of anarchyʼ. Invoking the aforementioned contractual argument, he emphasised that ʻthe people of the Sunnaʼ living in Europe and America recognise that there is an agreement, a covenant, between them and their receiving lands that they must never violate.
46 A book disseminated by the same website detailed the history of the Khawarij and the Prophetic traditions anticipating and condemning them, and described al-Qaeda and ISIS as their modern reincarnation, noting that ʻthey do not serve the interests of Muslims, their governments, nations or landsʼ.
47 Mahdī stressed that just as the Khawarij were not considered a legitimate expression of pluralism in Islam, so alQaeda cannot be considered to be one. Emphasising that the Khawarij were ʻderided for their deviation and self-amputation from the orthodox Muslim bodyʼ, the author argued that it is just as right to oppose their ʻmodern-day incarnationʼ.
48 A leaflet distributed by the London Masjid Daar us Sunnah invoked several Prophetic traditions that warned against the future rise of the likes of the Khawarij, noting that the Prophet predicted that the Khawarij will be 'young of age' and 'foolish of mind' as indeed are those who join the imposter caliph, Abū Bakr al-Baġdādī, and his Islamic State. 
Conclusion
An array of arguments has been invoked by Salafis in Britain and in Germany as part of their efforts to refute the accusations that they cultivate radicalisation and to assert the religious legitimacy of their rejection of violence. These include the religious duties to abide by contracts; respect the Islamic rules of warfare and jihad; avoid harming the inter-44 ABŪ 'l-BARĀʾ 2014. ests of Muslims and of Islam in Europe; and oppose modern-day Khawarij against whom the Prophet Muḥammad warned.
Salafi anti-violence preaching has been directed at two audiences: Western governments and publics, whom Salafis aim to convince that salafiyya is not a security risk; and Muslims, whom they aim to convince that violence is not the way of the salaf. These teachings in no way constitute a break from the generally anti-liberal, pro-separateness Salafi agenda. What Salafis argue is that while Muslims in Europe should disavow nonMuslims, oppose liberal norms and reject integration, they must, at the same time, refrain from joining, or supporting, jihadi attacks against Western targets in any way.
Data as to the actual effect of anti-jihadi preaching are inconclusive and call for further research. Arguments for the positive influence exposure to Salafi doctrine has on some Muslims conflict with evidence for the relatively high levels of involvement of former attendees of Salafi communities in terror activities. A possible explanation is that Salafi views have a different effect on people in different situations. Salafi leaders are confident that their mosques are the most reliable firewall against violent radicalisation. But calls for restraint, voiced as part of a broader doctrine of intolerance, risk falling at times on deaf ears.
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